Sunday, June 26, 2011
Friday, June 24, 2011
Wednesday, June 22, 2011
Sunday, June 19, 2011
Thursday, June 16, 2011
Palestinian propaganda, exonerating the IDF, (again)
A new Palestinian hate page on facebook (H/T Simon Plosker at HonestReporting) has this photo on. It shows, supposedly an Israeli soldier struggling with a Palestinian child. But a careful examination shows the soldier isn’t fighting, he is too busy carrying a heavy gun. And when we look to the right an adult hand is supporting this child, otherwise he would fall. Now if Israeli soldiers are so dangerous, why Palestinian adults feel confidant enough to throw their kids at them?
There is more than one story coming out of this picture, non of them favorable to the Palestinian side.
There is more than one story coming out of this picture, non of them favorable to the Palestinian side.
Friday, June 3, 2011
Osama Bin Laden is dead. Two more are left.
Osama Bin Laden is dead, and that is good, very good, but there are two more monsters remain, his deputy, Ayman Al Zawahiry and the Taliban’s top leader Mullah Omar.
Prior to the killing of Bin Laden a debate took place in MSM as to whether his Al Qaeda had any actual power left following their defeat and that of the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2002. This debate forgot the nature of their appeal in the eyes of their followers and sympathizers. To these crowds, (or sub-culture of Jihadism), these three are regarded as saints, living divine saints. It is difficult to explain this type of sainthood to the modern humanistic mindset. Suffice it to say that it is sainthood gained by bravado. It is bravado that is made from mass killings, and the ability to evade punishment for those crimes. An important and well-known ingredient of this sainthood is the PR campaign. A campaign that is loaded with Islamic motifs that serve as an excuse and glorification of those crimes, incorporated in a ‘come and catch me’ attitude - bravado.
Because of this “sainthood” their death will have a complex effect on the War on Terror, but one that will benefit the fighting democracies.
There are in fact several benefits. The first one comes from the above-mentioned sainthood. This “sainthood” created a situation where every new leader rising through the ranks, like Anwar Al Awalki in Yemen, will be always under their shadow. And this is a discouragement for every glory-seeking leader. (Unless they can get local or regional political power the way Al Awalki did. This is a different incentive, which isn’t necessarily available in every region).
The second benefit is the deterrence that had been achieved as a result of killing all three of them. This deterrence sent a clear and obvious message to all Bin Laden wannabes. If your role models can be caught and killed so can you. The apparent length of this chase enhances that deterrence, because the United States comes out of it as patient, never letting hunter. And that is a third benefit.
Such an achievement means that the soviets came to the graveyard of empires to spread communism and failed. But the Americans came to Afghanistan to catch the people responsible for 9/11 and succeeded. Success is the only good way to leave Afghanistan. It is important to turn that country into a reasonably functioning state. But not at all cost. Simply put: if Afghans won’t fight for Afghanistan, no one else should. Some forces will be needed in that country to keep Afghanistan’s troubles inside Afghanistan and to intercept any renewed attempts by Al-Qaeda or any another terrorist organization to make Afghanistan their base. But these are containment operations and not securing a nation-building endeavor. What is more important is the ability to declare victory in the graveyard of empires. This will be a huge moral booster to the coalition. And even a bigger demoralizer to the enemy.
This victory, once achieved is therefore of strategic importance. Constantly demoralizing the enemy is the only way to end their appeal and ability to recruit, fighters, technicians, engineers, propagandists, and financiers. It will also end the first phase of the War on Terror. This was the phase that started with the first attack on the World Trade Center in New – York City, on the 26th of February 1993. This was the fight against the global hierarchical Al-Qaeda, where Osama Bin Laden and Aymann Al Zawahiry were the commanders in chief, and Mullah Omar, their host and protector in Afghanistan, was the one who made it all possible. Under his protection Al-Qaeda became a global army of terrorists, able to perform horrific mass murder attacks worldwide, culminating in 9/11.
However, since Al Qaeda, and other Jihadists organizations, will definitely try to reverse this situation, this victory will launch the third phase of the “War on Terror,” the nuclear phase. The only way they can reverse the impact of an American claim of victory in Afghanistan. Knowing the vengeful nature of Al Zawahiry, who always promises heavy retributions upon the enemies of Islam, his idea of Islam, this phase may have already begun.
What makes these phases unique is that when one begins, the previous one had not necessarily ended. The second phase in the War on Terror, is the fight against regional Al Qaedas, in the Arabian Peninsula, Northwest Africa, etc. It begun with the defeat of Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2002, and will end when regional forces have the will and the means to crash them. Something that won’t happen without western support and encouragement, and some level of active participation. Fighting the three forms of Al Qaeda at the same time requires developing and implementing different strategies at the same time. That can be as complicated as a war on multiple fronts.
The nature of the war against religious fundamentalism is such that one strategic victory is not enough. If history is a teacher, and it usually is, and a good one, then we, the democracies of this world, are in for a long haul. During the middle ages, when Western Europe was under the spell of religious fanaticism, the Islamic world, the saner side at the time, was able to bring the crusades to an end, by constantly inflicting defeats on them. In a period of nearly three centuries, those defeats had an accumulating effect, which dried out the crusades from supporters and volunteers. Will it take this long this time?
Hard to tell. Today’s holy butchers make a good use of modern communication technologies to enhance the impact of their actions, and to win over recruits. There is no reason why the west shouldn’t use that as well, to enhance the impact of its victories. But the most important lesson from the killing of Osama Bin Laden, is that patient is an asset. Impatience will always play into the hands of the enemy. But if America can claim victory in Afghanistan, which is not the case yet! then there is good reason to believe it can win the War on Terror, in a shorter amount of time then it took to defeat the crusaders. But first, all three must be killed, and not just Bin Laden, until then this is all hypothetical.
Prior to the killing of Bin Laden a debate took place in MSM as to whether his Al Qaeda had any actual power left following their defeat and that of the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2002. This debate forgot the nature of their appeal in the eyes of their followers and sympathizers. To these crowds, (or sub-culture of Jihadism), these three are regarded as saints, living divine saints. It is difficult to explain this type of sainthood to the modern humanistic mindset. Suffice it to say that it is sainthood gained by bravado. It is bravado that is made from mass killings, and the ability to evade punishment for those crimes. An important and well-known ingredient of this sainthood is the PR campaign. A campaign that is loaded with Islamic motifs that serve as an excuse and glorification of those crimes, incorporated in a ‘come and catch me’ attitude - bravado.
 |
| Ayman Al-Zawahiri & Mullah Omar Defeating Al Qaeda means putting them in the crosshairs.. |
Because of this “sainthood” their death will have a complex effect on the War on Terror, but one that will benefit the fighting democracies.
There are in fact several benefits. The first one comes from the above-mentioned sainthood. This “sainthood” created a situation where every new leader rising through the ranks, like Anwar Al Awalki in Yemen, will be always under their shadow. And this is a discouragement for every glory-seeking leader. (Unless they can get local or regional political power the way Al Awalki did. This is a different incentive, which isn’t necessarily available in every region).
The second benefit is the deterrence that had been achieved as a result of killing all three of them. This deterrence sent a clear and obvious message to all Bin Laden wannabes. If your role models can be caught and killed so can you. The apparent length of this chase enhances that deterrence, because the United States comes out of it as patient, never letting hunter. And that is a third benefit.
Such an achievement means that the soviets came to the graveyard of empires to spread communism and failed. But the Americans came to Afghanistan to catch the people responsible for 9/11 and succeeded. Success is the only good way to leave Afghanistan. It is important to turn that country into a reasonably functioning state. But not at all cost. Simply put: if Afghans won’t fight for Afghanistan, no one else should. Some forces will be needed in that country to keep Afghanistan’s troubles inside Afghanistan and to intercept any renewed attempts by Al-Qaeda or any another terrorist organization to make Afghanistan their base. But these are containment operations and not securing a nation-building endeavor. What is more important is the ability to declare victory in the graveyard of empires. This will be a huge moral booster to the coalition. And even a bigger demoralizer to the enemy.
 |
| Osama Bin Laden, Posing sainthood in battledress |
This victory, once achieved is therefore of strategic importance. Constantly demoralizing the enemy is the only way to end their appeal and ability to recruit, fighters, technicians, engineers, propagandists, and financiers. It will also end the first phase of the War on Terror. This was the phase that started with the first attack on the World Trade Center in New – York City, on the 26th of February 1993. This was the fight against the global hierarchical Al-Qaeda, where Osama Bin Laden and Aymann Al Zawahiry were the commanders in chief, and Mullah Omar, their host and protector in Afghanistan, was the one who made it all possible. Under his protection Al-Qaeda became a global army of terrorists, able to perform horrific mass murder attacks worldwide, culminating in 9/11.
However, since Al Qaeda, and other Jihadists organizations, will definitely try to reverse this situation, this victory will launch the third phase of the “War on Terror,” the nuclear phase. The only way they can reverse the impact of an American claim of victory in Afghanistan. Knowing the vengeful nature of Al Zawahiry, who always promises heavy retributions upon the enemies of Islam, his idea of Islam, this phase may have already begun.
What makes these phases unique is that when one begins, the previous one had not necessarily ended. The second phase in the War on Terror, is the fight against regional Al Qaedas, in the Arabian Peninsula, Northwest Africa, etc. It begun with the defeat of Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2002, and will end when regional forces have the will and the means to crash them. Something that won’t happen without western support and encouragement, and some level of active participation. Fighting the three forms of Al Qaeda at the same time requires developing and implementing different strategies at the same time. That can be as complicated as a war on multiple fronts.
The nature of the war against religious fundamentalism is such that one strategic victory is not enough. If history is a teacher, and it usually is, and a good one, then we, the democracies of this world, are in for a long haul. During the middle ages, when Western Europe was under the spell of religious fanaticism, the Islamic world, the saner side at the time, was able to bring the crusades to an end, by constantly inflicting defeats on them. In a period of nearly three centuries, those defeats had an accumulating effect, which dried out the crusades from supporters and volunteers. Will it take this long this time?
Hard to tell. Today’s holy butchers make a good use of modern communication technologies to enhance the impact of their actions, and to win over recruits. There is no reason why the west shouldn’t use that as well, to enhance the impact of its victories. But the most important lesson from the killing of Osama Bin Laden, is that patient is an asset. Impatience will always play into the hands of the enemy. But if America can claim victory in Afghanistan, which is not the case yet! then there is good reason to believe it can win the War on Terror, in a shorter amount of time then it took to defeat the crusaders. But first, all three must be killed, and not just Bin Laden, until then this is all hypothetical.
Wednesday, April 6, 2011
The Egyptian revolution, the United States and Israel, testing old textbooks and writing new ones
I’m probably going against the current that dominated the pro-Israel blogsphere by saying that the American administration was right in supporting the largely peaceful ouster of president Hosni Mubarak of Egypt. But I do believe that to be the case.
In explaining my opinion it is important to point out that both this current and the said American policy are due to sound reasons. This current of Israel based skepticism exists mainly because of the crisis in US Israel relationships that took place last year over planned constructions in East Jerusalem. This crisis left many Israelis and supporters of Israel distrustful of the Obama administration. This mistrust was echoed in the concern some Israelis had that the abandonment of Mubarak preludes an abandonment of Israel. But there is no comparison between the American Middle East policy of March 2010 and that of February 2011. Then the United States acted as if it had a textbook of new ideas regarding Middle East peace making. But since those ideas were new, and with no relation to past experience, the textbook was actually a guessing book. However, during the more recent Egyptian crisis of January and February 2011, they did had a textbook to read from, an old and reliable one. It is called “How to address a dysfunctional allied dictatorship,” or “How not to get bogged down in another Vietnam.” It is an important book that proved itself in 1986 during the ouster of Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines. Then a pro-western tyrant was removed from power in a way that kept the country as an ally of the west without slipping into an endless civil war involving thousands of American troops.
The American lesson from Vietnam is very clear; an unpopular allied dictatorship that lost its ability to enforce itself on its population is not a strategic ally but a strategic burden. But the Middle East is not Southeast Asia. In Southeast Asia as in Latin America, the United States of America earned the animosity of millions because it supported brutal unpopular despots. But in the Middle East the unpopularity of the United States predates the relationships with the tyrannies of the region, and even the United States itself. This animosity is an ideological one, an opposition to the American and western values of democracy and civil liberties and not just the policies. They are based on the widespread of popular intolerant ideologies, such as nationalism, pan-nationalism, and religious fundamentalism. These ideologies are rooted in the history of the region. It is a history of empires and kingdoms ruled by Arab dynasties and Islam as their official religion. These intolerant and even anti democratic ideologies are the legacy of that era. They had produced hostile anti democratic regimes such as that of Gamal Abdle Nasser in Egypt, and the Wahabi regime of the Saudis in the Arabian Peninsula whose origin goes back to 1744. Their starting position was that of hostility to the west and its democratic values. But as their own internal difficulties grow and as the region’s political arena changed, creating mutual threats to them and the west, the two sides got closer. It is a simple convergence of interests that created a near lose-lose situation for the west and in particular its leadership, the United States of America. The duration of these regimes, their corruption, and repression, undermined severely their popularity. Their new proximity to already hated United States, acted as a reconfirmation of the corruption of these regimes. Simultaneously it reaffirmed the bad image of the west.
In explaining my opinion it is important to point out that both this current and the said American policy are due to sound reasons. This current of Israel based skepticism exists mainly because of the crisis in US Israel relationships that took place last year over planned constructions in East Jerusalem. This crisis left many Israelis and supporters of Israel distrustful of the Obama administration. This mistrust was echoed in the concern some Israelis had that the abandonment of Mubarak preludes an abandonment of Israel. But there is no comparison between the American Middle East policy of March 2010 and that of February 2011. Then the United States acted as if it had a textbook of new ideas regarding Middle East peace making. But since those ideas were new, and with no relation to past experience, the textbook was actually a guessing book. However, during the more recent Egyptian crisis of January and February 2011, they did had a textbook to read from, an old and reliable one. It is called “How to address a dysfunctional allied dictatorship,” or “How not to get bogged down in another Vietnam.” It is an important book that proved itself in 1986 during the ouster of Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines. Then a pro-western tyrant was removed from power in a way that kept the country as an ally of the west without slipping into an endless civil war involving thousands of American troops.
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| The Vietnam war |
 |
| Learning the lessons from Vietnam and adapting them to a different region. That is the American challenge in the Arab spring of 2011 |
This fundamental difference does not suggest that the Vietnam experience is irrelevant here; after all there are similarities. It does suggest that some adjustments are needed. This rises equally from the Israeli textbook. Like the American textbook it is based on sound experience, however there isn’t a lot of text in it, just a few lines. ”Avoid another Iran, beware of the Muslim Brotherhood, remember how Hamas, one of their offshoots took over Gaza, both by elections and by force.” In the leaderless revolution that took place in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood is the most likely opposition group to benefit since it is the largest and most organized. Along with its anti-democratic and anti-Israeli platform, which it had obscured but not abandon, it is a genuine threat and not just a bogyman in quotations. This suggests that the best course of action based on the Israeli warning signs is to crash the Lotus revolution. But that runs into conflict with the next line in the Israeli textbook. “Beware of another Lebanon, were a civil war created Hizbullah and gave the hegemonic seeking Iran a major foothold in that country.”
What these two textbooks tell us is that they are not in conflict with one another. Rather they are in the same place, in need of new ideas. In a situation like this the events on the ground are the ones that are writing the new textbooks, events that are being shaped by the political forces currently working in Egypt. These forces are the ruling military elite, the Muslim Brotherhood, and the general public who only began to be an active political player.
The questions are what each of them want, what are their goals, concerns, and priorities:
What does the current regime see as a greater threat, Iran, Islamization, anarchy, or the spread of democracy?
What does the Muslim Brotherhood want? To hijack the revolution the way Khomeini did in 1979 Iran, or use the democratic process the way Hitler did? Or do they intend to leave things as they are so they can enjoy the new opportunities without risking loosing their gains by starting political upheavals whose final outcome cannot be predicted?
And what are the priorities of general public, democracy or jobs?
These unanswered questioned are the making of uncertainty. And there is no need to list its drawbacks, especially in the Middle East, where the stakes are high. Here chaos and bloodshed can be no more the one mistake away. Writing damn good textbooks for everyone involved.
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