Showing posts with label US Middle East policy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label US Middle East policy. Show all posts

Thursday, September 16, 2021

My list of the top 11 obstacles for peace in the Middle East.

 From top to bottom, in descending order of severity.

1)     Different narratives that are sometimes conflicting.

2)     Lack of hope among the general public on both sides.

3)     Lack of trust on both sides.

4)     Continued Palestinian rejectionism of the negotiation process.

5)     An international, (and Israeli) peace movement that is more of a cult of Israel bashing, rather than any actual peace advocacy, or peace making.

6)     An array of “neutral” ngo’s that are in-fact an extreme expression of the former.

7)     Anti-Israel biases within the global media that makes it clear to everyday Israelis why peace should not be trusted. Also, an expression of 5.

8)     The UN.

9)     A hopelessly divided Palestinian leadership.

10)  Chronically unstable Israeli governments. This is due to Israel’s current system of government.

11)  The settlements.

 

What defines severity here is the ability to change/remove these obstacles.

Settlements had been removed before; and therefore, can be removed again. The question is what Israel gets in return.

Israel’s political system can change. It requires public support. The need to change it, is mainly due to internal reasons; unstable coalitions, and extortion power to smaller political parties. Changing it requires public support. When it comes to the peace process these weaknesses can be bypassed. But not always successfully.  

The Palestinian leadership can unite. If the leadership will it. Since their motivation for maintaining the division is that of personal gains that is less likely. And if they do unite, will that be behind an extremist message, a practical one, or a moderate one?

The UN will change if global politics change. Right now, it is another battlefield.

I don’t know what can change 5,6, and 7. But if they can, they can help alleviate, 3, 2, and 1. In that order. They will help the process; the process will do most of the work. The process will create trust in the process itself. This will serve at first as substitute to the lack of mutual trust. As the trust in the process increases, it will lead to some degree of mutual trust. As this is increased, hope will be rekindled. As hope, and trust increases, they will energize the dialogue. Opening the way for a dialogue of narratives, the hardest part of the process. Where it can all fall apart again.

For the process to restart, the Palestinian leadership must attend the process, change 4. The longer they procrastinating the less we have a motive to resume it from our side.

Tuesday, March 19, 2013

Obama's visit to Israel, a disaster to come?


By the time this will be posted on my blog president Barak Obama will be in Israel, or just about to. His long awaited, not so long awaited, necessary, not necessary visit will finally take place.
If you follow all the discussions in media, from MSNBC to Fox, the visit is not about advancing the peace process. It is about winning over the Israeli public. As Jeffrey Goldberg puts it: "Crack the Israeli code".
Why is that important?
Popularity never hearts in politics, and without the backing of a popular figure the peace process cannot gain popular support. So it is about the peace process. It is just that other US presidents did not need to do that. They always enjoyed a strong popularity among the Israeli public; especially George W. Bush and Bill Clinton. Obama on the other hand has the lowest popularity figures any serving US president ever had. Therefore, if he wants to push the peace process forwards, he need to increase his popularity among Israelis.
It is a separated discussion as to why his popularity so low. The more urgent question is, is it doable?
Yes, it is doable. Israelis like liking American presidents.
That does not mean it is going to happen. Judging from the remarks Deputy National Ssecurity advisor Ben Rhods gave to the Israeli press corps, optimism has little to hold on to.
All the damage is in this quote:

Presidant Brack Obama (right), and Deputy National Ssecurity advisor Ben Rhods (left).


"The US believes that Israel must show it is serious about its peace efforts. It must convince the general Arab public, if nothing more to maintain Israel's peace treaty with Egypt."

This statement is wrong on several levels. First it is patronizing. Friendly atmosphere cannot start with telling people they must behave themselves. Even if the patronizing is correct. The problem with this patronization is that it is neither. It is not correct it and it is not incorrect. Each side has its own ideas as to what is serious about peace and what is not serious about peace. In a peace process the peace broker is not suppose to give the two parties another reason to bicker.

And it gets worse, because the way Ben Rhods phrased his advice he already took a side in a dispute that has not happened yet!
He took the side of Egypt. This alienates Israelis because from their point of view they have already made a series of territorial concessions, with security risks attached. Some may not consider these concessions serious since the settlements continue to expand. Right or wrong this is precisely the kind of a debate a peace broker hopes to avoid.
But in peace making debates like this are nothing more than headaches. Now, these headaches are not fun, to say the least. Ask James Baker III; ask Madeleine Albright; ask Henry Kissinger. But broken peace accords are worse.

Right now Egypt is ruled by the Muslim Brotherhood. This is a popular political party that opposed the peace process vehemently. It is reality and American pressure that prevents them from breaking it. Since Ben Rhods took Egypt's side, he gave them a way out of the peace accords. With each side having its own ideas as to what 'serious about peace' is, all the Egyptian leadership has to do is to use Ben Rhods remarks as a go ahead is to constantly claim Israel is not serious about peace, back it up with mass street demonstration, which they can arrange easily. Until finally they have an excuse to break the Camp David Peace Accords. Needless to say, the Camp David Peace Accords are one the most important achievements of American foreign policy. Something both Democratic and Republican administrations worked hard to achieve and maintain.
None of these had happened yet, thankfully. All that is needed is for the most powerful man on earth to express this logic publicly. The impression from the discussions in the Israeli media is that is not going to happen. Let hope these impressions are correct since Ben Rhods is the one writing the president's speeches for president Barak Obama visit to Israel.

Wednesday, June 20, 2012

A nuclear Iran, answering Kenneth Waltz

In an opinion piece published in USA Today, under a title that can be mistaken for satire, Professor Kenneth Waltz of Colombia University suggests we shouldn’t worry about a nuclear Iran. His main argument, “Although it is impossible to be certain of Iranian intentions, it is far more likely that if Iran desires nuclear weapons, it is for the purpose of enhancing its own security, not to improve its offensive capabilities.

Professor Kenneth Waltz of Colombia University 

As to what those security concerns might be he does not speechifies, however, unlike Israel Iran has a huge strategic depth. Its geography, its huge population, and its level of economic development, all adds up to a formidable deterrence; without any need for nuclear weapons. In short, Iran is a country that doesn’t have to worry about its own security, as long as it does not infringe on the security of others. Once it does that, it gives other countries a good reason to make a special effort in order to infringe on Iran’s security. Unfortunately for Professor Kenneth Waltz’s argument that is precisely the kind of Iran we have today. In Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon, Egypt, the Gaza Strip, and elsewhere. If Professor Kenneth Waltz wishes to reassure the world about a nuclear Iran he should first reassure the world about a non-nuclear Iran.

At another part of his article he argues that Israel’s nuclear capabilities are responsible for the instability in the Middle East. How does Israel’s, supposed, nuclear capabilities relate to the huge social gaps within the Arab world? How does it affect the total GDP of 22 Arab nations? Without oil this GDP is lower than that of Switzerland. How is that Israel’s fault? And what about illiteracy, high unemployment, the Sunna and Shia split, gross gender inequality, and other recognized internal causes of instability. Are they all because Israel has nuclear weapons? Under this type of reasoning, the moon landing is to blame for all the major airplane crashes that followed.
According to USA Today, Kenneth Waltz’s article is a condensed version of a paper that will be published in the July - August issue of Foreign Affairs, so maybe the answers will be there.

Geography alone debunks Waltz’s argument.


 See also Ira Stoll at Commentary Magazine.

Saturday, January 7, 2012

Syria 2016 – An approximate map

Arab Spring
An eyesore and a headache to come – soon



Syria is disintegrating. No news in that statement.
Like a clay vase cracking, we hear the cracks, but cannot see them, yet. Not all of them anyways. But just like Yemen, soon the body will collapse. Unlike Yemen there will be those that will pick up the pieces and try to hold the Syrian vase together.      
These are international and regional forces that are already been drawn into a mess no one is able to control or contain.
The above map is an assessment how Syria will look in the future, probably in the year 2016.

The main participants will be Iran and Turkey. Iran is heavily invested in Syria, and Turkey cannot afford an unstable border.
The Iranians have allies in and around Syria:
The currently ruling Alawites, with a center of power in the Nusariah mountains in the northwest near the Mediterranean.
Hezbollah - the terror organization that rules southern Lebanon.
And the Shia governed Iraq, on Syria’s long eastern border.
They are all useful as proxies that will hold onto Iranian interests in that country and in the region. And may even be able to expand Iranian influence within Syria.

Turkey may have eyes towards regional hegemony or leadership, but in broken clay Syria it will settle for her immediate security concerns. Concerns limited to the northern part of the country. In civilian communities it will be the protector and backer of political forces friendly to Ankara. Closer to the border and near the Kurdish enclave in northern Iraq, it will deploy its military. This is for the obvious reasons of preventing attacks and infiltrations from the Kurdish PKK, Al – Qaeada, and other Islamist terror groups.
This division will be the outcome of a brief but brutal Shia vs. Sunni war within Syria. A conflict that may have already begun and over time will resemble a similar conflict that took place in Iraq after the American invasion.
In this division Turkey is already the de facto leader of the Sunni Arab dominated Syrian opposition. This is because this opposition has no unified leadership. And it needs Turkey to represents their interest in front of the outside world and settle their internal disputes.

But Turkey will not be able to rule its portion of Syria along. It will need the Arab League support as a seal of approval. And the Arab League will need presence on the ground to show that there is content, Arab content, to its statements and resolutions. Therefore they will be in charge on the majority of the Sunni Arab section of Syria. Most of it is the area between Damascus and Aleppo. The official control will be that of the Syrian state. But it will be a fragile control, a mostly nominal one. And the representatives of the Arab League will be constantly trying to strengthen it in order to keep it out of reach of Islamist terror organizations and criminal elements. These organizations are already there. Taking their share of Syria. The areas they’ll hold on to will most likely be the buffer zones between everybody else.

It is true that there is no one that is more ill suited to do this than the Arab League. But there is no one else. NATO is out of the question. Russia and China will never agree to it. Neither will the Arab world that sees NATO as ally of Israel. And NATO itself had enough in Afghanistan and Libya. The UN is less unlikely, but at the same time not very likely. Syria under the UN supervision is no longer a Syria that confronts Israel. Keeping the image, and position, of Syria as a major Arab opponent of Israel, on Israel’s border, will be the main reason for the Arab league to step in.

Russia is invested in Syria far longer than Iran. When Syria is in chaos they will need presence on the ground to secure their investment. There is also Russia’s agelong interest in keeping the waterways of the Black Sea open. Which always required presences in the Mediterranean. Both concerns will require at minimum, presence along the Syrian coastline. Not all of it, just in a portion that secures a port for a battleship or two. The West will have to agree because it’s either that or pirates.

The United State has its own concerns. Protecting the oil rich Kurdish enclave in northern Iraq, and safeguarding the stability of the Kingdom of Jordan. Both are long time allies of the United States of America. Both are under threat from Sunni extremists and Iranian expansionism. The open question is how and how far will the United States go to protect them. Kurdistan is a part of Iraq and the United States had left Iraq. But did America abandon the Kurds in the process?
And how much will they leave for the Saudis when it comes to protecting Jordan from fundamentalists’ infiltrations from southern Syria?

Lebanon is already caught in a vise between Sunni extremists and Iranian expansionism. Traditionally it is a French zone of interest. The braek up of Syria will offer France new possibilities to protect those interests, as well as new threats. If France gets the co-operation of the EU its involvement can be more effective. Both France and the EU are not great fans of large-scale interventions. This means a mostly civilian presence in a small portion of Syria near the part of Lebanon that is not under Iranian influence. The need to provide security for that presence will increase its military aspect. But the success of the EU involvement will be determined by what will happen in Lebanon.

China will also be involved. Wherever Russia will be so will China. This will be a continuation of the co-operation they have today over the Syrian crisis.

The big unknowns are in the southwestern part of Syria. It contains the Israeli border, the Druze enclave of the Hauran (Horan) Mountains, and the bulk of the Syrian army, stationed in the Golan Heights. Israel will be in a tough dilemma. On one hand Israel does not want to be drawn into a sectarian conflict that will be worse than what she had experienced in Lebanon in the 1980’s. On the other hand allowing the Syrian border to be under Iranian control is unacceptable. Israel already has a border with Iran. (Through Hezbollah Iran already controls Lebanon’s border with Israel). To prevent that Israel may go to war. This will be a war to prevent a war under worse conditions. It is obvious that the United States and the EU do not want to see this border become volatile. And not just out of concern for the security of Israel. It is possible that Russia and China share similar interests in maintaining regional stability, though not necessarily at the same level of urgency. Since Iran needs their protection over the nuclear issue, they may pressure Iran out of that area. Since the UN is already there, (see UNDOF), its role may expand until a more agreeable and effective arrangement is reached.

There is virtually no information about the Druze minority in Syria. Even though the turmoil begun on their doorstep, in Daraa. Like most of the non-Sunni Arab minorities, they are a part of the regime’s ring of support. How that support manifests in the current crisis is unknown. As do the views and mindset of the people that make up the Druze of Mt. Hauran. Not to mention those of other minorities. This makes prediction impossible. But as the situation remains unsolvable, Syria’s minorities may opt to migrate, abandon Syria completely. The Druze may have an extra encouragement to do due to Syria’s growing water crisis.

The most dangerous unknown is the Syrian army in the Golan Heights, which is the bulk of its armed forces. Where its loyalty lies in this internal conflict? What is the situation of its current weaponry and ammunition? Again, no information is available to make predictions. It is possible that the soldiers and commanders hate the regime. But their commitment to the struggle against Israel overrides their emotions.

By 2016 those questions and others will be answered. Till then the approximate map will have to settle for question marks.

The final note is a note of hope. Damascus and Aleppo are Syria’s only hope for a better future in the long run, beyond 2016, beyond 2020. These two ancient cities were always centers of international trade. If they’ll be given effective protection and administration, they can reclaim that function. If abandoned, and allowed to became Mogadishus, Syria will be replaced by smaller political entities, mirroring the 2016 situation. In this scenario Syria will be a swamp of endless localized conflicts, and a safe heaven for terrorist and criminals. A destabilizing territory, regionally and internationally.

p.s. This map can be the reality in 2014.

Friday, June 3, 2011

Osama Bin Laden is dead. Two more are left.

Osama Bin Laden is dead, and that is good, very good, but there are two more monsters remain, his deputy, Ayman Al Zawahiry and the Taliban’s top leader Mullah Omar.

Prior to the killing of Bin Laden a debate took place in MSM as to whether his Al Qaeda had any actual power left following their defeat and that of the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2002. This debate forgot the nature of their appeal in the eyes of their followers and sympathizers. To these crowds, (or sub-culture of Jihadism), these three are regarded as saints, living divine saints. It is difficult to explain this type of sainthood to the modern humanistic mindset. Suffice it to say that it is sainthood gained by bravado. It is bravado that is made from mass killings, and the ability to evade punishment for those crimes. An important and well-known ingredient of this sainthood is the PR campaign. A campaign that is loaded with Islamic motifs that serve as an excuse and glorification of those crimes, incorporated in a ‘come and catch me’ attitude - bravado.


Ayman Al-Zawahiri Mullah Omar
Ayman Al-Zawahiri & Mullah Omar
Defeating Al Qaeda means putting them in the crosshairs..


Because of this “sainthood” their death will have a complex effect on the War on Terror, but one that will benefit the fighting democracies.

There are in fact several benefits. The first one comes from the above-mentioned sainthood. This “sainthood” created a situation where every new leader rising through the ranks, like Anwar Al Awalki in Yemen, will be always under their shadow. And this is a discouragement for every glory-seeking leader. (Unless they can get local or regional political power the way Al Awalki did. This is a different incentive, which isn’t necessarily available in every region).

The second benefit is the deterrence that had been achieved as a result of killing all three of them. This deterrence sent a clear and obvious message to all Bin Laden wannabes. If your role models can be caught and killed so can you. The apparent length of this chase enhances that deterrence, because the United States comes out of it as patient, never letting hunter. And that is a third benefit.

Such an achievement means that the soviets came to the graveyard of empires to spread communism and failed. But the Americans came to Afghanistan to catch the people responsible for 9/11 and succeeded. Success is the only good way to leave Afghanistan. It is important to turn that country into a reasonably functioning state. But not at all cost. Simply put: if Afghans won’t fight for Afghanistan, no one else should. Some forces will be needed in that country to keep Afghanistan’s troubles inside Afghanistan and to intercept any renewed attempts by Al-Qaeda or any another terrorist organization to make Afghanistan their base. But these are containment operations and not securing a nation-building endeavor. What is more important is the ability to declare victory in the graveyard of empires. This will be a huge moral booster to the coalition. And even a bigger demoralizer to the enemy.


Osama Bin Laden
Osama Bin Laden,
Posing sainthood in battledress

This victory, once achieved is therefore of strategic importance. Constantly demoralizing the enemy is the only way to end their appeal and ability to recruit, fighters, technicians, engineers, propagandists, and financiers. It will also end the first phase of the War on Terror. This was the phase that started with the first attack on the World Trade Center in New – York City, on the 26th of February 1993. This was the fight against the global hierarchical Al-Qaeda, where Osama Bin Laden and Aymann Al Zawahiry were the commanders in chief, and Mullah Omar, their host and protector in Afghanistan, was the one who made it all possible. Under his protection Al-Qaeda became a global army of terrorists, able to perform horrific mass murder attacks worldwide, culminating in 9/11.

However, since Al Qaeda, and other Jihadists organizations, will definitely try to reverse this situation, this victory will launch the third phase of the “War on Terror,” the nuclear phase. The only way they can reverse the impact of an American claim of victory in Afghanistan. Knowing the vengeful nature of Al Zawahiry, who always promises heavy retributions upon the enemies of Islam, his idea of Islam, this phase may have already begun.

What makes these phases unique is that when one begins, the previous one had not necessarily ended. The second phase in the War on Terror, is the fight against regional Al Qaedas, in the Arabian Peninsula, Northwest Africa, etc. It begun with the defeat of Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2002, and will end when regional forces have the will and the means to crash them. Something that won’t happen without western support and encouragement, and some level of active participation. Fighting the three forms of Al Qaeda at the same time requires developing and implementing different strategies at the same time. That can be as complicated as a war on multiple fronts.

The nature of the war against religious fundamentalism is such that one strategic victory is not enough. If history is a teacher, and it usually is, and a good one, then we, the democracies of this world, are in for a long haul. During the middle ages, when Western Europe was under the spell of religious fanaticism, the Islamic world, the saner side at the time, was able to bring the crusades to an end, by constantly inflicting defeats on them. In a period of nearly three centuries, those defeats had an accumulating effect, which dried out the crusades from supporters and volunteers. Will it take this long this time?

Hard to tell. Today’s holy butchers make a good use of modern communication technologies to enhance the impact of their actions, and to win over recruits. There is no reason why the west shouldn’t use that as well, to enhance the impact of its victories. But the most important lesson from the killing of Osama Bin Laden, is that patient is an asset. Impatience will always play into the hands of the enemy. But if America can claim victory in Afghanistan, which is not the case yet! then there is good reason to believe it can win the War on Terror, in a shorter amount of time then it took to defeat the crusaders. But first, all three must be killed, and not just Bin Laden, until then this is all hypothetical.

Wednesday, April 6, 2011

The Egyptian revolution, the United States and Israel, testing old textbooks and writing new ones

I’m probably going against the current that dominated the pro-Israel blogsphere by saying that the American administration was right in supporting the largely peaceful ouster of president Hosni Mubarak of Egypt. But I do believe that to be the case.
In explaining my opinion it is important to point out that both this current and the said American policy are due to sound reasons. This current of Israel based skepticism exists mainly because of the crisis in US Israel relationships that took place last year over planned constructions in East Jerusalem. This crisis left many Israelis and supporters of Israel distrustful of the Obama administration. This mistrust was echoed in the concern some Israelis had that the abandonment of Mubarak preludes an abandonment of Israel. But there is no comparison between the American Middle East policy of March 2010 and that of February 2011. Then the United States acted as if it had a textbook of new ideas regarding Middle East peace making. But since those ideas were new, and with no relation to past experience, the textbook was actually a guessing book. However, during the more recent Egyptian crisis of January and February 2011, they did had a textbook to read from, an old and reliable one. It is called “How to address a dysfunctional allied dictatorship,” or “How not to get bogged down in another Vietnam.” It is an important book that proved itself in 1986 during the ouster of Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines. Then a pro-western tyrant was removed from power in a way that kept the country as an ally of the west without slipping into an endless civil war involving thousands of American troops.



The Vietnam war
 The American lesson from Vietnam is very clear; an unpopular allied dictatorship that lost its ability to enforce itself on its population is not a strategic ally but a strategic burden. But the Middle East is not Southeast Asia. In Southeast Asia as in Latin America, the United States of America earned the animosity of millions because it supported brutal unpopular despots. But in the Middle East the unpopularity of the United States predates the relationships with the tyrannies of the region, and even the United States itself. This animosity is an ideological one, an opposition to the American and western values of democracy and civil liberties and not just the policies. They are based on the widespread of popular intolerant ideologies, such as nationalism, pan-nationalism, and religious fundamentalism. These ideologies are rooted in the history of the region. It is a history of empires and kingdoms ruled by Arab dynasties and Islam as their official religion. These intolerant and even anti democratic ideologies are the legacy of that era. They had produced hostile anti democratic regimes such as that of Gamal Abdle Nasser in Egypt, and the Wahabi regime of the Saudis in the Arabian Peninsula whose origin goes back to 1744. Their starting position was that of hostility to the west and its democratic values. But as their own internal difficulties grow and as the region’s political arena changed, creating mutual threats to them and the west, the two sides got closer. It is a simple convergence of interests that created a near lose-lose situation for the west and in particular its leadership, the United States of America. The duration of these regimes, their corruption, and repression, undermined severely their popularity. Their new proximity to already hated United States, acted as a reconfirmation of the corruption of these regimes. Simultaneously it reaffirmed the bad image of the west.

US Middle East policy – 2011
Learning the lessons from Vietnam and adapting them to a different region.
That is the American challenge in the Arab spring of ‏2011

This fundamental difference does not suggest that the Vietnam experience is irrelevant here; after all there are similarities. It does suggest that some adjustments are needed. This rises equally from the Israeli textbook. Like the American textbook it is based on sound experience, however there isn’t a lot of text in it, just a few lines. ”Avoid another Iran, beware of the Muslim Brotherhood, remember how Hamas, one of their offshoots took over Gaza, both by elections and by force.” In the leaderless revolution that took place in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood is the most likely opposition group to benefit since it is the largest and most organized. Along with its anti-democratic and anti-Israeli platform, which it had obscured but not abandon, it is a genuine threat and not just a bogyman in quotations. This suggests that the best course of action based on the Israeli warning signs is to crash the Lotus revolution. But that runs into conflict with the next line in the Israeli textbook. “Beware of another Lebanon, were a civil war created Hizbullah and gave the hegemonic seeking Iran a major foothold in that country.”

What these two textbooks tell us is that they are not in conflict with one another. Rather they are in the same place, in need of new ideas. In a situation like this the events on the ground are the ones that are writing the new textbooks, events that are being shaped by the political forces currently working in Egypt. These forces are the ruling military elite, the Muslim Brotherhood, and the general public who only began to be an active political player.

The questions are what each of them want, what are their goals, concerns, and priorities:

What does the current regime see as a greater threat, Iran, Islamization, anarchy, or the spread of democracy?

What does the Muslim Brotherhood want? To hijack the revolution the way Khomeini did in 1979 Iran, or use the democratic process the way Hitler did? Or do they intend to leave things as they are so they can enjoy the new opportunities without risking loosing their gains by starting political upheavals whose final outcome cannot be predicted?

And what are the priorities of general public, democracy or jobs?
These unanswered questioned are the making of uncertainty. And there is no need to list its drawbacks, especially in the Middle East, where the stakes are high. Here chaos and bloodshed can be no more the one mistake away. Writing damn good textbooks for everyone involved.

Tuesday, August 25, 2009

US Palestine relationships – same old intransigent

The sixth Fatah congress in Bethlehem is now over, passing not surprisingly, hardline intransigent resolutions. The right of return, which is the demand for all of Palestine from the river to the sea, preserving the right to fight by any means, an old slogan that harbors some of the worse atrocities in the past 50 years, Munich, Maalot, Savoi and many, many more. Yes, they’ve said that what they mean this time is the demonstrations along the security barrier at Ne’ilin and Bil’in, but those demonstrations are there to clear away the barrier so Palestinian mass murder organizations will regain the easy access they had to our population centers in order to resume their mass slaughter of our civilians. This time though they added a cherry to their demands, all of Jerusalem including the western part, that which is within Israel proper, within the green line, that part which they tried to take in 1947 and 1948 by trying to starve its 100,000 Jewish residents.
What is left of the Israeli left tried to defend this by calling it starting positions, but these are starting positions since 1993, and when they are that long, they are called intransigent and hardline non-compromising positions.
But the thing is, it is nothing new at all, cause no matter who was in the white house, whether there was a peace process or not, or whether the prestige of a US president was at stake or not, the Palestinians always did something intransigent, something non compromising, or worse, which was contradictory to what a peace process supposed to be.

During the time of George W. Bush we saw Hamas wining the parliamentary elections then taking over violently the Gaza strip, including the Rafah district, which they lost to Fatah.
During the presidency of William Jefferson Clinton, Arafat himself gave the extremist punch line by blowing up the Camp David negations and then many of us israelis. During the time of George H. Bush Arafat allied himself with Saddam Hussein. The era of Roland Reagan began with more katyusha rockets attacks on communities in northern Israel and ended with the formation of Hamas. When jimmy Carter was president they rejected the peace between Israel and Egypt and continued their campaign of mass murder of Israeli civilians inside Israel and abroad as well as against Jewish targets, this was the presidency of Jerald Ford and Richard Nixon. And during the time of Lyndon Johnson the PLO came to be with the charters of 1964 and 1968 that called for the destruction of Israel and the violence to match.




So what’s the deal? What was old becomes new again?