US Israel relationship: The peace process’ beggar’s choice

Seventh in a series of seven

parts: 1  2  3  4  5  6  7

At some point during the Ramat Shlomo/ Dalal Mughrabi crisis, the Obama administration realized that what they were doing was counterproductive, and abruptly stopped their pressure. The administration went as far as blocking the supporting tailwind they got from their own media, another fact indicating there are no anti-Israel intentions behind this administration's policies, or else they would have continued their pressure. What brought this about has been the subject of countless unproven tales, guesses, and speculations. Many have an understandable need to know the full story, but until reliable first hand information comes out, this is futile, a waste of time.

What matters now is to move the peace process forwards. Idealistic as it may sound, peace is the moral and ethical obligation of the elected head of any state founded on the sanctity of life. In the Israeli Palestinian context this peaceful resolution is most likely to be the two states solution. Debate aside; as far as the author of this series is concerned this is the best solution. But more importantly for this discussion, this is the solution the international community publicly committed itself to. The question is how to get there? The answer is, not by haste, not by force, and not by storm, but by constructing workable agreements and understandings on the myriad of lesser issues separating the two peoples. Issues that are less controversial in each society, therefore an agreement is more likely to be reached regarding them. It is known as a peace process from the bottom up. When trust is at extremely low levels the bottom is the only place it can restart. And right now the level of trust is low also between the Israeli public and the current American administration for reason explained earlier in this series, though things may not be as bad as they were earlier this year, 2010.

While the trust of the Israeli public in the current American leadership will be extremely useful in order to gain their trust in the peace process, that is not in the books right now. But that is just a means to an end, the end being regaining the trust in the peace process. And that can be done gradually. If further Israeli concessions do not lead to another wave of violence, more can follow. The peace process will advance measured step by measured step. This is possible due to a point of agreement between Israelis and Americans. The main disagreement here is whether Israel has a peace partner. The Americans are saying yes, but the Israeli experience from the implementation of the Oslo peace process created a lot of skepticism regarding that answer. But the more recent experiences show a Palestinian Authority willing and able to provide security and engaged in economic development. This suggests that Israel at least has a partner for security and economic development and co-operation. This partner for something is the common ground between Israelis and Americans. Even if that something is different as far as each of them believes. Since both Israelis and Americans have the same interest, the two states solution, Israel will not object to use these security and development agreements as a platform for the final resolution of the conflict. All Israelis need is a reasonable amount of confidence nothing dreadful will follow further concessions. Constant success will balance the bad experience from the Oslo years and the skepticism it created. From the point of view of peacemaking this can be the equivalent of the truce Israel had with Egypt and Jordan before the peace agreements with them.

For these renewed process to be successful the settlements freeze must end. The reason for that is plain and obvious, since this moratorium was announced Mahmoud Abbas has entrenched himself so deep in a rejectionist position, in took the pressure of the entire world to get him out of it and into direct talks with the Israeli Prime Minister. And even that only when the moratorium was about to expire. This behavior is the exact opposite of what is expected from a peace partner when gestures are made towards him. One explanation is that he is indeed not a peace partner. True or not, this explanation is highly subjective, based on the highly traumatic Israeli experience. The negotiators should not belittle that experience; they should address it as part of the accountability of the process itself. But Israel on its part must not let the traumas override other concerns and other explanations. The other explanation here has to do with the governability of Mahmoud Abbas and the Palestinian Authority, or what they might perceive as threats to it.

When it comes to the issue of concessions over the settlements, 17 years of negotiations and concessions taught us that there are two types of concessions, facilitating concessions, and final-resolution concessions. Facilitating concessions facilitate the establishment of an autonomous Palestinian entity, (currently the Palestinian Authority). They include the A regions handed over to the Palestinians at the beginning of the Oslo process. There the Palestinian Authority rules and no settlements activity can take place. And the promise made by the first Netanyahu government to the Clinton administration, not to build new settlements, a decision that prevents the settlements from blocking the territorial continuity of a future Palestinian state. The removal of roadblocks and other travel restrictions are also facilitating concessions. These are also security concessions, and as such contain security risks for Israel and for Israelis.

Final resolution concessions are those related to the core issues of the conflict. They are the issue of the refugees, the fate of Jerusalem, the final status of the settlements, and recognizing Israel's right to exist as the nation state of the Jewish people.

These issues are connected, if the Israeli premier makes a major concession on the settlements issue, an issue that divides the Israeli society and puts his administration on the line; the Palestinian leadership is expected to do the same. But they have constantly proven themselves unable to do so. When former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak offered most of the West Bank in 2000, former Palestinian Authority President Yasser Arafat launched a wave of violence that scarred both nations. When Ehud Olmert offered similar concessions to Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas in 2008, Abbas did not return his calls. And when Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced the settlements freeze – putting all the settlements and their future on the table, Mahmoud Abbas refused to engage in direct talks with him. This is a pattern that shows that the Palestinian leadership cannot take on its own challenging issues. Concessions on issues such as the "right" of return or Palestinian refugees could threaten their leadership and their ability to govern. Adding to the threat already posed by Hamas from the Gaza Strip and from within the West Bank.

The settlement freeze is therefore a threat to the governability of the Palestinian peace partner. But in the long run it is also a threat to the governability of the Israeli peace partner. The settlements freeze is difficult to enforce. Besides the use of means of law enforcement, it requires political and economic pressure on the leadership of the ideological settlers, and the co-operation of the general population of the settlers. And that can be achieved only with a time limit, or a major Palestinian reciprocal gesture, the kind Mahmoud Abbas is unwilling or unable to provide. This pressure in all its forms will finally erode. And the extremists will find a way to bypass these restrictions. They are numerous, they know the terrain better, and they have done it before. The outposts, illegal or not, are a successful method of bypassing the Israeli government’s decision not to built new settlements. And since the settlement freeze includes all the settlements, the longer it continues the more likely it is to push the moderates towards the extremists. Whatever form this resistance will take, the mere images of an unenforceable moratorium will undermine the governability of the Israeli peace partner. This will create two lame duck peace partners, sending to hell the credibility of the peace process, again!

The Israeli Palestinian conflict is a low intensity conflict; therefore it has greater room for mistakes then other trouble spots, but this too will end. It is important to remember that all rulers have their weakness, putting them in a position that enhances their weakness, and they will became lame ducks. And needless to say the peace process won’t work with two lame ducks peace partners.

While it is highly apparent that this stick, the settlement freeze, cannot be pulled out from between the wheels of the peace process without bruising every one involved. After that bruising everyone will have to return to the talks, if they want peace. The solution to the problem created by the settlement freeze is the same type as the solution to the conflict will be. It is a solution where no one is happy, the settlers won’t get the building spree they fantasized about, and those who insisted on a complete settlement freeze will have to stomach low level of construction.

Beside lack of trust, and threats to the governability of the peace partners, a successful peace process must address the opposing narratives each side holds. Right now both Israeli and Palestinian economies are growing. It is a major encouragement for optimism, but until each side tries to understand the other’s narrative, and bridge the two, this optimism is wishful thinking. The opposing narratives are the reason why the core issues are so difficult. They are deep held national consensuses for both sides. And for each political entity it is the source of legitimacy in the eyes of its population, a source of legitimacy for the very existence of that political entity.

The Israeli narrative is the more flexible one, changing somewhat along the political spectrum. However the Palestinian narrative is still refusing to acknowledge any legitimate Israeli claim. But the biggest problem coming from the Palestinian narrative has to do with the role violence. As a strategic weapon the Palestinians had abandoned violence because it had failed disastrously. But the legitimacy of it was not abandoned; on the contrary, it is cherished and preserved by various means. Stone throwing in “non-violent” demonstrations, enforcing violently a boycott of produce from the settlements by burning them rather then returning them and finding alternatives, and commemorating mass murderers like Dalal Mughrabi and Yahya Ayyash, the father of suicide bombings. These are all different expression of the preservation of the sanctity of violence. In each of those actions, there is a component of violence that is not necessary to achieve the declared goal it is used for. For example, like any nation the Palestinians have a right for their own national heroes. But the criterion for these heroes is the high number of unarmed Israeli civilians they killed, rather than individuals who faced overwhelming odds. Even if we accept a claim that says that this practice is not evidence that shows that Mahmoud Abbas and Fatah are not peace partners, we must not forget that the core value of peace is the sanctity of life. Therefore no peace process can stand on the sanctity of violence. This contradiction will either erode or explode any peace agreement.

This may lower the optimism expressed in the mainstream media in the early weeks of September, but how truly optimistic this optimism was? Think of the reasoning that said that this time it would work because both sides are extremely skeptic. This is the same rational as that of a person taking pride in ones own humility. This absurdity is therefore not a sign of hope but another mark of desperation.

In this peace process, all of us who want peace are beggars facing limited choices. We cannot take the choices we yearn for but do not have. It does not mean that we should give up on peace making. It does mean we should treat it like all duties of government, requiring good judgment, accountability, responsibility, realism, and credibility. Even if the actual chances for peace are worse then described here, at the end, all those who want to continue living on this land, Israelis and Palestinians, are beggars as well, facing no choice other then living together. This is another desperate argument, but beggars can’t be choosers. So, as US emissary George Mitchell had said, we need to keep trying. But trying for the sake of trying is not enough, something basic the public debate seems to have missed.

Related link:

Delusions of "peace:" Breaking the conspiracy of silence

Dvar Dea

Previous

US Israel relationships a seven parts series:
The public debate, correcting a favorable picture
The public debate, Israel and the war on terror
The Palestinian component
The right wing component
The Israeli exclamation mark, Obama's triple inheritance
The Israeli exclamation mark, unbalancing outreach w go-between
The peace process' beggars' choice

US Israel relationships: the right wing component

Forth in a series of seven

parts: 1  2  3  4  5  6  7

No discussion of the Palestinian component is complete without discussing the settlements component. As a part of the reality on the ground, the settlements and the outposts do have the ability to prevent the establishment of a Palestinian state – yet the settlements are not an obstacle to peace. As Israel has proven twice in its history it can remove them if it believes it is of its interest to do so. And for settlement blocs that cannot be removed due to their size, both sides accepted the concept of territorial exchange as a substitute.

The problem is not the settlements per se. The settlements serve as a political symbol, representing right wing Israeli policies, and the power center of some of Israel’s right wing political forces. However, not all settlers are rightwing, or extremists. And not all the right-wingers in Israel who support the settlements project are settlers, and that includes extremists and even fringe elements. But to those fringe elements the West Bank is the main attraction for mischief, hooliganism, and as history shows, their own brand of brutal terrorism. This is a well-recognized obstacle to peace, but first and foremost it is an internal threat to Israel as a law-abiding state and a sovereign state.

This threat to peace is not the main challenge the advocacy of peace faces when engaging the Israeli right. The Israeli right is an integral part of Israeli society and politics. With power and influence in the Knesset, the Israeli street and within the current coalition government. It is an important and legitimate competitor in the contest to win over the Israeli public opinion, over a multitude of issues, among them the peace process. It has three main assets in that debate, the emotional attachment many Israelis have to the West Bank, known as Judea and Samaria, the security concerns, and its position in the government, which adds an aura of authority to their arguments.

When forming this government Benjamin Netanyahu knew he had to choose between the heart, a right wing coalition, and the brain, a centric coalition. A coalition with all the big parties in the new Israeli parliament, Likud, Kadima, Labor, Israel Beitenu, and the major religious party Shas. But the smart choice has its drawbacks: The personal animosity between Netanyahu and Tzipi Livni, the head of Kadima, the bad blood between the two parties since the split over the disengagement from Gaza, and the uncomfortable situation that would have taken place in such a coalition, where the largest member of the coalition, Kadima, is not the political party of the Prime Minister. These are understandable difficulties but ones that can be overcome if there is a will to do so by the two political parties and their leaders. Perhaps a greater will than the one that held together, barely, Israel’s national unity governments in the 1980’s. Then Shamir, Peres and Rabin had their share of deep personal and ideological differences. And between the Likud and the Labor party there was resentment and bitterness that went back five decades. But in spite of all of that, they held two governments together.

The choice Netanyahu did take was a compromise between the brain and the heart, dropping the most extreme right wing party, ‘Ichud Leumi,’ and taking in the Labor party. In this coalition the Labor party has two roles. The first is to provide a link with the international community, whic has a known disapproval of extremist governments. And the second is to balance the extremists that are in this coalition. In order to support this task he brought his own personal import into the Likud party: The seasoned politicians Dan Meridor and Beni Begin, and former chief of staff of the Israeli army Moshe Yaalon. These respected politicians could offer moderation or an ability to reason with the extremists and hardliners in the coalition and within the Likud party itself. But due to the Israelis disillusionment with the peace process, the Labor party, just like its natural ally Meretz, is at its weakest position ever, and the Likud itself radicalized. The result is an inability of the Israeli government to create political initiatives. This is a serious political handicap for Israel, which most of the time was overshadowed by Mahmoud Abbas's refusal to enter direct talks during the ten month settlement freeze. But when negotiations do take place, the extreme right in the Israeli government and in the coalition can act as an internal opposition, limiting the Prime-Minister's ability to maneuver. And when that happens the public debate over those issues, which never truly ends, goes into high gear.

In this debate the right wing emphasizes security concerns from a future Palestinian state. The leftovers of the hard-core Zionist left, emphasize demographic concerns. They fear that if the situation remains as it is Jews will be minority in their own state, undermining Israel’s democratic character and turning it into an apartheid state. The Israeli center, mainly the Kadima party, expresses security concerns emanating from the conduct of the Palestinian side, Hamas as well as the Palestinian Authority; and demographic concerns: The fear that an Arab majority will undermine Israel’s Jewish character and Jewish sovereignty.

It is a debate where the United States government's known position is an important argument in favor of the two-state solution, but not the only important argument. This puts the United States in a position where it has to work out how to take part in the debate without getting involved in internal politics. This is something that will be a lot easier for the Americans to do if Israel had its own imitative. But this is unlikely due to the nature of the current Israeli government.

The fact that the Israeli right wing, and the American administration, any American administration, doesn’t like each other very much is stating the obvious. Although the Israeli right has political and ideological allies in American political arena, their reach and influence over the shaping of the American foreign policy is limited. This known ideological dispute opens to interpretation what is considered involvement in Israel's internal politics. The right has a maximal interpretation and the left, minimal. These ulterior motives are common knowledge in the Israeli society; therefore neither claim is automatically accepted. This gives the American side the ability to ignore these charges when the Israeli right makes them, as long as the fundamental concerns of all Israelis are respected, such as security and national sovereignty. Ignoring them will only vindicate the right wing accusations. And the trust of Israelis in such an administration will be a ‘no,’ add a storm to that policy and the ‘no’ will have an exclamation mark.

Obstacle to peace?
Clockwise: evicting a settler, Gaza Strip 2005, the ruins of the settlement of Kfar Darom, evicting a settlement, Gaza Strip 2005, the eviction of Yamit, Sinai 1982.



Dvar Dea

Previous  Next


US Israel relationships a seven parts series:
The public debate, correcting a favorable picture
The public debate, Israel and the war on terror
The Palestinian component
The right wing component
The Israeli exclamation mark, Obama's triple inheritance
The Israeli exclamation mark, unbalancing outreach w go-between
The peace process' beggars' choice

US Israel relationships, the Palestinian component

Third in a series of seven

parts: 1  2  3  4  5  6  7

Why is the Israeli Palestinian peace process so difficult?
There are of course many reasons for that. One reason, which many veteran American diplomats and negotiators acknowledge with a sigh of desperation and exhaustion, is the tendency of both sides to bicker like children during the negotiations. This is not something that is easy to admit but it is apart of the problem.

Another reason, one that has no comical side to it, is the fact that in any such negotiations Israelis are asked to entrust their personal security in the hands of their enemies. This requires a huge leap of faith even under more promising conditions. Nowadays it means retaking security risks involving fears and anxieties no parent should relive. But these are Israel’s political realities, realities Israel must engage no matter how impossible they are. At the same time these realities don’t create trust out of thin air, and without trust the peace process cannot move forwards. This is where the negotiator, who is also a good friend and a close ally, comes in. As a participator in the negotiations, and co signatory with reputation on the line, the significant but not unlimited trust Israelis have in such a negotiator allay some of their concerns.

This is why the famous picture from Camp David I, of the three heads of states had a reassuring effect. This is why President Bill Clinton's support for the Oslo accords helped maintain a large pro – peace vote in Israel in spite of three waves of Palestinian initiated violence. And that is why George W. Bush's support for the disengagement from Gaza helped get the support of a majority of already skeptic Israelis. Since the results of the disengagement from Gaza are what they are, if George Bush or Bill Clinton, as leaders of the United States, were to ask Israelis for something similar their chances of success would have been very small. For any other person in that high office less so, and for Barack Obama even less. This is evident from a June 2010 survey, quoted by CBS’ Katie Couric in her Benjamin Netanyahu interview. That survey found that 71% of Israelis dislike President Obama. This finding is an indicator of deep mistrust; since no US president had such low approval rating in Israel. This means that the most likely Israeli answer to the question whether they trust President Obama won't be just “No”; but rather “No!” A “No” with an exclamation mark, at least for the time of the survey.

There are three main phases building up to that “No!” The first is the public debate discussed in parts 1 and 2 of this series, which was more of an aggravating factor. The second is the Palestinian Authority discussed here below. The third is the Obama administration policies prior to Netanyahu’s visit to Washington in July 2010, discussed in the sixth article in this series.

Defenders of the Palestinian Authority have said that it is fulfilling its obligations under the Oslo Accords, fighting terrorism and governing the major cities in the West Bank where Israel allowed their police forces to redeploy. Even if this is true grave concerns remain:

1) The Palestinian Authority is doing NOW what it was supposed to do in the 1990s. If they are really fulfilling their commitments, they are doing it only after a wave of brutal violence they had initiated. What assurances does Israel have that if the Palestinians sign new agreements, let’s say about Jerusalem, they won’t implement them the same way, after another run of violence of their choice and making?

2) How do the Palestinians implement this alleged cooperation? With the help of a deep American involvement. There is a Palestinian American Prime Minister, with no constituency of his own other than the American and international support, and a security force commanded and established by an American general. If the Americans ease or cease their involvement will this continue or fade as if it never existed?

3) Why are they cooperating? At least a part of the answer, and not a small part, is because of fear of Hamas that is literally pointing a gun at their temple and kneecap. As solid as Hamas’ rule over Gaza currently appears, a successful missile strike into Israel or a successful terror attack against Israelis in the Sinai will lead to an Israeli military intervention that has a good chance of removing that regime, or contributing to its demise. Once that happens, and this motivation to cooperate is gone, what will encourage the Fatah/Palestinian Authority to continue their cooperation? Would the international fiscal support be enough or will they just take it and hide it, the way Yassar Arafat did?

4) There is always a cloud over the Palestinian Authority’s ability to govern. Can what happened in Gaza repeat itself in the West Bank in a similar way or a different one? Will Fatah hold itself together once Mahmoud Abbas is no longer in charge?

5) Incitement continues under the PA. As the history of the Oslo Process had shown, incitement is the engine of terrorism. Territorial concessions created opportunities for both peace and war. But the history of the Oslo process had demonstrated that incitement from both the PA sources and opposition sources contributed to the turning of territories handed over by Israel into launching pads of terrorist attacks against Israeli civilians.

6) The Palestinian Authority is Fatah; in recent history the Tanzim in Nablus, another part of Fatah, was on Hizbullah’s payroll and command. Along with the 'Karin A' affair this grounds in reality an Israeli concern that a corrupt Palestinian Authority will switch sides and starts working with the Iranians.

All of these suggest that the Palestinian leadership has a long way to go in order to prove itself an able and willing peace partner.

Left to right, Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad and Palestinian president Mahmoud  Abbas

These concerns are not something Israel should hide behind when expected to deliver its part in the peace process, and help and encourage further Palestinian self-rule. At the same time this is not something the quartet should ignore, especially not the United – States. The lack of easy answers as to how they should go about this is the reason why the peace process is difficult.

Dvar Dea

Previous  Next


US Israel relationships a seven parts series:
The public debate, correcting a favorable picture
The public debate, Israel and the war on terror
The Palestinian component
The right wing component
The Israeli exclamation mark, Obama's triple inheritance
The Israeli exclamation mark, unbalancing outreach w go-between
The peace process' beggars' choice

Why must we be the suckers now? Avigdor Lieberman's orchestra of nonsense.

I hate to transfer internal debates to the international arena, I have a Hebrew blog for that, but in our times, when nothing stays private so to speak, some concerns and doubts need to be said.
To be blunt Israel’s foreign affairs minister public denunciation of the two state solution while de facto accepting it makes suckers of us all. While the Palestinians are the ones who actually rejected the idea, due to the statements of Lieberman and those who share his views, we have painted ourselves as the guilty party; guilty in the crime that victimized us. Because the constant Palestinian rejection of the two state solution was always expressed in brutal murderous violence against our civilian population. Therefore it’s hard for me to fathom the political wisdom behind these statements.
Even though the tone has subsided by now the bias elements in the international media, which are known to be vast, won’t let these statements be forgotten. As a result, we the advocates have to undo the damage. But bombastic statements can only be undone by other bombastic statements or a contradictory action. Any word or fact we say or use may make our case better understood on the micro level, but won’t change the general bad impression of this government.
Liberman has his followers in the advocates’ community, people I respect like Melanie Philips and Daniel Pipes, if they can defend his reasoning, so be it. But as I read the news here in Israel the new/old prime minister now talks about a political self-rule to the Palestinians whose status will be determined in the future. That status can only be only one thing and one thing alone, a Palestinian state. This means a predictable course of events, the international/peace process is going to take a few steps, when push come to shove, the Palestinian leadership will either stall or bail, and we will get the blame. Which returns us to my opening question, why must we be the suckers now?
Even if this predictable episode will not be bloody, hopefully, what’s the point of going through it?
Anybody…?