US Israel relationships, the Palestinian component

Third in a series of seven

parts: 1  2  3  4  5  6  7

Why is the Israeli Palestinian peace process so difficult?
There are of course many reasons for that. One reason, which many veteran American diplomats and negotiators acknowledge with a sigh of desperation and exhaustion, is the tendency of both sides to bicker like children during the negotiations. This is not something that is easy to admit but it is apart of the problem.

Another reason, one that has no comical side to it, is the fact that in any such negotiations Israelis are asked to entrust their personal security in the hands of their enemies. This requires a huge leap of faith even under more promising conditions. Nowadays it means retaking security risks involving fears and anxieties no parent should relive. But these are Israel’s political realities, realities Israel must engage no matter how impossible they are. At the same time these realities don’t create trust out of thin air, and without trust the peace process cannot move forwards. This is where the negotiator, who is also a good friend and a close ally, comes in. As a participator in the negotiations, and co signatory with reputation on the line, the significant but not unlimited trust Israelis have in such a negotiator allay some of their concerns.

This is why the famous picture from Camp David I, of the three heads of states had a reassuring effect. This is why President Bill Clinton's support for the Oslo accords helped maintain a large pro – peace vote in Israel in spite of three waves of Palestinian initiated violence. And that is why George W. Bush's support for the disengagement from Gaza helped get the support of a majority of already skeptic Israelis. Since the results of the disengagement from Gaza are what they are, if George Bush or Bill Clinton, as leaders of the United States, were to ask Israelis for something similar their chances of success would have been very small. For any other person in that high office less so, and for Barack Obama even less. This is evident from a June 2010 survey, quoted by CBS’ Katie Couric in her Benjamin Netanyahu interview. That survey found that 71% of Israelis dislike President Obama. This finding is an indicator of deep mistrust; since no US president had such low approval rating in Israel. This means that the most likely Israeli answer to the question whether they trust President Obama won't be just “No”; but rather “No!” A “No” with an exclamation mark, at least for the time of the survey.

There are three main phases building up to that “No!” The first is the public debate discussed in parts 1 and 2 of this series, which was more of an aggravating factor. The second is the Palestinian Authority discussed here below. The third is the Obama administration policies prior to Netanyahu’s visit to Washington in July 2010, discussed in the sixth article in this series.

Defenders of the Palestinian Authority have said that it is fulfilling its obligations under the Oslo Accords, fighting terrorism and governing the major cities in the West Bank where Israel allowed their police forces to redeploy. Even if this is true grave concerns remain:

1) The Palestinian Authority is doing NOW what it was supposed to do in the 1990s. If they are really fulfilling their commitments, they are doing it only after a wave of brutal violence they had initiated. What assurances does Israel have that if the Palestinians sign new agreements, let’s say about Jerusalem, they won’t implement them the same way, after another run of violence of their choice and making?

2) How do the Palestinians implement this alleged cooperation? With the help of a deep American involvement. There is a Palestinian American Prime Minister, with no constituency of his own other than the American and international support, and a security force commanded and established by an American general. If the Americans ease or cease their involvement will this continue or fade as if it never existed?

3) Why are they cooperating? At least a part of the answer, and not a small part, is because of fear of Hamas that is literally pointing a gun at their temple and kneecap. As solid as Hamas’ rule over Gaza currently appears, a successful missile strike into Israel or a successful terror attack against Israelis in the Sinai will lead to an Israeli military intervention that has a good chance of removing that regime, or contributing to its demise. Once that happens, and this motivation to cooperate is gone, what will encourage the Fatah/Palestinian Authority to continue their cooperation? Would the international fiscal support be enough or will they just take it and hide it, the way Yassar Arafat did?

4) There is always a cloud over the Palestinian Authority’s ability to govern. Can what happened in Gaza repeat itself in the West Bank in a similar way or a different one? Will Fatah hold itself together once Mahmoud Abbas is no longer in charge?

5) Incitement continues under the PA. As the history of the Oslo Process had shown, incitement is the engine of terrorism. Territorial concessions created opportunities for both peace and war. But the history of the Oslo process had demonstrated that incitement from both the PA sources and opposition sources contributed to the turning of territories handed over by Israel into launching pads of terrorist attacks against Israeli civilians.

6) The Palestinian Authority is Fatah; in recent history the Tanzim in Nablus, another part of Fatah, was on Hizbullah’s payroll and command. Along with the 'Karin A' affair this grounds in reality an Israeli concern that a corrupt Palestinian Authority will switch sides and starts working with the Iranians.

All of these suggest that the Palestinian leadership has a long way to go in order to prove itself an able and willing peace partner.

Left to right, Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad and Palestinian president Mahmoud  Abbas

These concerns are not something Israel should hide behind when expected to deliver its part in the peace process, and help and encourage further Palestinian self-rule. At the same time this is not something the quartet should ignore, especially not the United – States. The lack of easy answers as to how they should go about this is the reason why the peace process is difficult.

Dvar Dea

Previous  Next


US Israel relationships a seven parts series:
The public debate, correcting a favorable picture
The public debate, Israel and the war on terror
The Palestinian component
The right wing component
The Israeli exclamation mark, Obama's triple inheritance
The Israeli exclamation mark, unbalancing outreach w go-between
The peace process' beggars' choice

US Israel relationships: The public debate, Israel and the war on terror

Second in a series of seven

parts: 1  2  3  4  5  6  7

During the Ramat Shlomo crisis, which was considered at the time the lowest point in the history of US Israel relationships, a problematic accusation circulated in the mainstream media. This was the accusation attributed to General Petraeus that claimed that Israeli policies are killing American soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan. As he himself had explained it to Philip Klein of the Spectator, it was taken out of context. And how often do public figures use the “taken out of context” defense when the media support their alleged views and not lash out at them? As he explained:

“There’s a 56-page document that we submitted that has a statement in it that describes various factors that influence the strategic context in which we operate and among those we listed the Mideast peace process, ... We noted in there that there was a perception at times that America sides with Israel and so forth. And I mean, that is a perception. It is there. I don’t think that’s disputable. But I think people inferred from what that said and then repeated it a couple of times and bloggers picked it up and spun it. And I think that has been unhelpful, frankly.”

One item out of a list long enough to fit 56 pages, not the single item, not THE item, one item out of many, everything else was the work of bloggers and probably spin doctors.

General Petraeus’ explanation is the reliable one for two reasons. First, it is his account of his own work. It is not the version of some self-appointed somebody who claims to have inside knowledge as if he or she wrote the general’s documents. Second, in the complex realities of every region, cause and effect are not that straightforward, whether it is South East Asia during the Vietnam War, or Western Europe during the Cold War. In the Middle East strategic planners must take into account stability of governments, economic disparity, religious and ethnic tension, illiteracy, gender discrimination, tribalism, and more. Just have a look at Yemen, where most of these problems exist. There we find a large presence of Al Qaeda, the Al Qaeda that sent Umar Farrouk Abdulmutallab to attack the United States during Christmas 2009. They were able to form a large presence there because the country suffers from all the above-mentioned weaknesses and because they were chased out of other countries. Israel was not a factor since Yemen always had a hardline position against Israel.



General Petraeus


While there is no question that the Israeli – Palestinian conflict does interact with terrorism, history and reality do not accommodate those who claim Israeli policies are at fault. As history shows us, it can easily be seen as the other way around. That is, progress in the peace process brings about a rise in terrorist activity. The best example is the murder of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in 1981 as a direct result of the successful peace negotiations with Israel. Moreover, the spike in Al Qaeda attacks on American targets in the 1990s, from the first attack on the Twin Towers to the planning of the second attack, occurred when the Oslo peace process was on an upswing. And recently, the murder of 4 Israeli civilians, one of them a pregnant woman, by Hamas, on august the 31^st, just before the talks were about to begin in Washington D. C.

It is quite possible that recruiters for terrorist organizations can use the Israeli Palestinian conflict as a means of persuasion and recruitment. However, it is equally possible for them to use a successful peace process. They can always argue that the Palestinians and the whole Arab/Muslim nation are being cheated. For all terrorist organizations the peace process itself is a threat. And any progress made will motivate them to do more harm, whether they are Jews, Palestinians or international Jihadists.

When it comes to the safety of American troops, history can argue the opposite as well, making the case that safety for American troops can result in casualties for Israel. In 1991 many Israelis agreed, reluctantly, not to respond against repeated Scud missile attacks by Saddam Hussein. That allowed President George Bush Sr. to maintain the American led multinational coalition needed to liberate Kuwait, another enemy of Israel, from Iraqi occupation. Fortunately the casualties among Israeli civilians were low. However, in 2001 and 2002 Israeli citizens were not so lucky.

Following the 9/11 attacks, the United States and its NATO allies were at war in Afghanistan. At the time Israel was in the midst of a horrific wave of suicide bombings and other mass murder attacks that had already killed more than 150 Israelis. Israel had every right to respond to those attacks, but international pressure kept her from responding effectively. There was more than one reason for that pressure, but the most effective pressure comes from the closest ally. After 9/11 this ally needed Israel to restrain itself in face of this brutal violence. This restraint was needed in order to help the United-States get the cooperation needed from major regional players, to launch an effective campaign against the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Israeli citizens suffered, horrifically, so that Americans will be safer on the mainland and on the battlefield. But when the monthly death toll in Israel peaked at 130 in March 2002, Israel could no longer afford agreeing to that pressure, and effectively began exercising its right to defend its citizens, in what was known as operation “Defensive Shield”. The United States and its NATO allies did not like the fact the Israeli army had returned to the West Bank and its major cities, but they did not pressure Israel to withdraw. With a NATO backed regime established in Afghanistan they did not need to restrain itself any more against the brutal provocation. Instead they began to establish a reliable Palestinian security force that will serve the purpose of the peace process.

Comparing death tolls, “how many Americans died for Israel?” or “how many Israelis died for America,” is the language of conflict; it is not the language of alliance. Allies help bring down each other’s death toll. The American administration is helping financing “Iron Dome” to protect Israeli population centers, and Israeli technologies are helping protect American soldiers in Afghanistan and Iraq. And at the same time they work to bridge the different sets of priorities each of them has as separate sovereign nations. Cracks are surely to come, as they surely will be overcome. But in this context this inserted language of conflict has the affect of slander, creating bitterness and suspicion when cooperation and communication are needed. Bordering on cheap sensationalism it also creates a simplistic and unrepresentative picture of the peace process, unbecoming the gravity and complexity of the problems entangling it. Not to mention disrespectful of the dead. When the mainstream media adopt this form of conversation it becomes a tragedy primarily for those who seek to advance the peace process. While the mainstream media are not where negotiations take place, they do affect public opinion. Public opinion can support the peace process as happened in the days following Sadat’s historic visit to Jerusalem. It can, alternatively burden it when tension, suspicion and mistrust, the inevitable obstacles to peace, are amplified, amplified by misguided concepts and probably hostile disinformation campaigns. These are, to borrow a quote from General Petraeus, “unhelpful.”

Dvar Dea,

Previous  Next

US Israel relationships a seven parts series:
The public debate, correcting a favorable picture
The public debate, Israel and the war on terror
The Palestinian component
The right wing component
The Israeli exclamation mark, Obama's triple inheritance
The Israeli exclamation mark, unbalancing outreach w go-between
The peace process' beggars' choice

US Israel relationships: The public debate, correcting a favorable picture

First in a series of seven
parts: 1  2  3  4  5  6  7

The American – Israeli crisis over the Jewish neighborhood of Ramat Shlomo in East Jerusalem is long behind us, almost forgotten because of other crises and events that followed. Analysts and commentators believe that the differences remain, but the American administration decided to address them non-confrontationally. If so, that is quite a u-turn from what was a highly charged clash of honor and anxiety.

This clash was not just between the two governments. One such non-governmental exchange was the minor and indirect clash of words between senior American journalist and New-York Times columnist Thomas Friedman and Israeli journalist and YNET contributor Avi Trengo. This was not a clash of equally matching titans. It is doubtful if Thomas Friedman even heard of Avi Trengo and his response. What is important here is not who each of these gentlemen is, but what they both represent. They are the two opposite ends of the narrowest divide of views between the majority of Israelis and the American left regarding the peace process. Avi Trengo is a representative of the largest and most underreported segment of Israeli society, the disillusioned peace activists, and peace voters. Only a handful of foreign reporters have reported on them, on their views and concerns. And the most important of those journalists is Thomas Friedman. One example of Friedman's attentiveness to this segment of the Israeli population followed his 2003 documentary for the Discovery Channel, “Straddling the fence,” about the construction of Israel’s effective security barrier. As he explained at the time to senior CNN anchorman Jonathan Mann: “But let me simply say one other thing. I'm sorry that that moral threat is there. I do believe it is a real danger to Israel, but I believe we cannot lose sight also of the fact, this fence is the fence that Hamas built. If there were no suicide bombings, there would be no fence.”

Thomas Friedman

While Hamas is not the only terrorist organization to use suicide bombings against Israeli citizens, understanding, and acknowledging the fears Israelis have from this threat, many of them supporters of the peace process, is a meeting of minds. This was an important meeting of minds because it took place over the issue of Israel's security barrier, which was strongly criticized by most of the world at the time.

But over Ramat Shlomo there was a parting of minds, and not a pleasant one. When Thomas Friedman referred to a regular housing announcement that had become a routine for 43 years as “Driving drunk,” Trengo responded, “Take your money back,” suggesting Israel should stop receiving the annual 3 billion dollars in financial aid from the USA, since it is really only 690 millions dollars a year; were the rest goes back to buy American military products. His suggestion was a rather simplistic understanding of the economic relationships between the two countries, which involve more factors than those annual loans or grants. What it does represent is not only an emotional counter response but also the will to act on one’s own words. Which meant that it was a crisis in which there were Israelis willing to sever the bond between the two nations, a bond these loans have come to represent.

February 17^th, 2002 is a day I will never forget: It was during the Intifada, with the worse still ahead of us. I participated in an intimate Peace Now demonstration as an active member. For more than 30 years, I shared Friedman’s view that a return to the 1967 borders is a magical solution. Yet during the rally, we were informed that a suicide bomber killed two children at a pizza parlor. The protestors observed a moment of silence, before the next speaker, a Palestinian “moderate,” took the stage. His speech focused solely on accusing Israel while going back to the Nakba and early days of Zionism. The terror attack at the pizza parlor in Karnei Shomron was not mentioned at all. I left the rally with a sense of disgust.


Avi Trengo

Thomas Friedman’s follow up “Hobby or necessity” tried to water down the dispute by explaining to his readers in both countries the other side’s positions and realities. This was an admirable and commendable undertaking, but one that he got wrong when it comes to Israel. In that article he argued that Israelis treat the need to reach peace as a hobby because they lost faith in the idea that Palestinians want peace. And because the Israeli economy is doing so well there is no need for peace. The first part is inaccurate, the second one, even more so.

To begin with, Israelis don’t consider the need to make peace with the Palestinians a hobby for a reason Thomas Friedman knows very well. Most Israeli families still send their sons and daughters to the army when they turn 18. Though the daily security situation has improved enormously due to the security barrier and other measures taken by Israel, it is not 100%. About once a year, the terrorists have a “success” in the form of a bombing, a shooting, or a stabbing. It is violence, which all Israelis, like all people, can do without.

Thomas Friedman builds a part of his article on a previous one written by Newsweek’s Dan Ephron and published on January 2^nd, 2010, “Who Needs Peace, Love, And Understanding, Anyway?“ From which he quotes: “in short, Israelis are enjoying a peace dividend without a peace agreement.” But that statement is wrong. A peace dividend is made up of two parts: the removal of the uncertainty of war from a country’s future, and the release of resources previously needed for maintaining a large army and waging a war. Therefore, Israel does not have a peace dividend. Its economy is doing well despite of the lack of a peace dividend. Imagine a country that does well without oil fields. Nonetheless it would certainly like to have oil fields so it can enjoy the oil boom and improve its economic independence. In the same way Israel would like to have a peace dividend. Israeli hi-tech firms would love to see their best and brightest no longer called for duty in the army reserves, and no one wants to see tourist attractions in the line of fire.

This is the economic part of the reasoning behind the arguments for peace that helped create and motivate the Israeli peace camp in the 1990’s. (The other part was the moral arguments regarding the occupation and the consequences of ruling over another people for a long period of time). The only thing that changed is the realization that there is no peace partner. If taking the path to peace has brought the very violence and dangers the advocates of peace and territorial concessions promise to avoid, why take that path again?

People don’t want to die, that is the sole reason behind the Israeli reluctance to resume the peace process, no more no less. Or to paraphrase Dan Ephron’s title, "Who Needs Peace, Love, And Understanding, if it keeps getting you killed?" Putting the blame on the relatively good condition of the Israeli economy serves two diversionary purposes. For Americans like Thomas Friedman, Dan Senor, and Saul Singer, this apparent anomaly, where the Israeli economy is doing better than the American economy, is a way of poking at those in charge of their economy to do better. For what is left of the hard core ideological left in Israeli, is a form of scapegoating and escapism. By not addressing and criticizing the Palestinian violence, its scale and brutality and the incitement that fed it, they lost the support of their natural constituency. However, instead of taking responsibility, they put the blame on the business success of this constituency. Thus portraying falsely an Israel that cares more about making money than making peace, as if there is a contradiction between the two.

The problem is that the hard core ideological left in Israel, on its various factions, Zionists and post-Zionists, seems to be the main conduit, favored by American and international media for explanations of the Israeli society. But this part of the Israeli left has a discredited ideology, denial, and an inability to reach the Israeli public, as evident by their devastating defeat in the elections of 2009. Therefore, their own understanding of Israeli society and politics is very limited and skewed.

This skewed picture, of a hedonist Israel, was introduced to the world in two articles: The above-mentioned article by Dan Ephron, and a later one by Karl Vick of the “Time” magazine.  Both articles base themselves on several omissions. First, that the reason the Israeli economy is doing better is because of sound economic policy, and not because of some mysterious business skills or hidden wealth. The second omission is the fact that most Israelis are very cautious in their optimism. Acutely aware of the weaknesses and vulnerabilities of their national economy, their confidence, no matter how high, always tries to avoid the trap of complacency. This is a recurring feature of all internal discussions inside Israel on this subject. But this discussion is absent from the Dan Ephron and Karl Vick articles. The third omission is the question that preoccupies many Israelis today. Is the current Palestinian leadership a partner for peace? As far as Ephron and Vick are concerned, this question shouldn’t be asked.

The fourth omission is a simple question that must be placed in front of Dan Ephron, Karl Vic, and others who share their intolerant and patronizing attitude. What do they expect a people who lost hope in the availability of peace to do? To sink into never ending depths of depression, or to invest and develop whatever part of their lives they can and make the best of it? Because this is what Israel has done. And this is what other nations would have done had they been in the same situation. And that is the purpose of this seven part series: to show that what Israel and Israelis are doing is not so unexplainable and inexcusable. In spite of the accusations its detractors make when they capitalize on the good intentions of Thomas Friedman, Dan Senor and others. Because when these slanders are made, ‘hedonistic Israel’, or ‘terror enabling Israel’, no one profits, especially not the peace process.

Dvar Dea

Next


US Israel relationships a seven parts series:
The public debate, correcting a favorable picture
The public debate, Israel and the war on terror
The Palestinian component
The right wing component
The Israeli exclamation mark, Obama's triple inheritance
The Israeli exclamation mark, unbalancing outreach w go-between
The peace process' beggars' choice

Something for Rosh Hashanah, In The Next Year, a Hebrew classic

I have found it by accident; it is nice.

Ground Zero mosque, an Israeli concern

When it comes to the attacks of September the 11^th, Israel was burned 3 times by this horrible crime. First by the attacks themselves, from the thousand killed there were Israelis in the towers and on the planes, not to mention hundreds of Jews. Then came the blood libels blaming Israel for those attacks. From Hizbullah, came the preposterous lie that no Jews were killed because Israel warned them, a lie that has popularity among Muslims in North America, see Marc Levin’s 2005 documentary ‘Protocols of Zion.’

The second libel, the more respected one, blames US policies towards Israel, as the reason for the murderous attacks. Al Qaeda attacked the United States for a simple reason, its ideology, an ideology that opposes everything western democracies stand for: personal liberties, freedom of religion, accountability of rulers, pluralism, and more. It is the same reason fascism, and communism were at war with the United States.

The blame on Israel rhetoric is a means to justify and support the terrorism Israel was subjected to. A terrorism that is no different then the one practiced by Al Qaeda. Both have been targeting innocent civilians in the name of Islam. The only difference is that Al Qaeda has a global agenda, and Hamas a regional one. Opposing one violent jihad in order to advance another is an act of criminal hypocrisy.

Al Qaeda is a global violent jihad movement; across the globe there are others, regional forms of violent jihad, in India, South Philippines, the Horn of Africa, Northern Nigeria, and in the Middle East against Israel. All have one thing in common, the deliberate systematic mass murder of unarmed civilians. And the best way to stop such behavior is to oppose them all. Partial opposition will get partial results if any.

But in the global political realities of today this is not going to happen. This creates a moral void that allows the occurrences of genuine war crimes and genocides, and the delegitimization campaign against Israel, long identified as a strategic threat to the country.

My concern is that this Islamic community center will allow within its walls the use of 9/11 and its proximity to the site to catapult anti Israeli ideologies and conspiracy theories. Ideologies that pretend to criticize Israel, but instead demonize and delegitimate her and support or justify the murder of its citizens.

This is not an opposition to the Islamic community center and the mosque in it. That is an American matter and a New Yorker matter. Israel’s concerns are within its sovereign territory, and with those who attack her. It is a ‘might take place’ concern and should not be treated as a ‘will take place’ concern, unless there is compelling evidence that such pro-jihadi activity is planned.

Even if this will turn out to be a ‘will take place’ concern, it will not override any of the arguments in favor of that Islamic community center. The values of freedom of religion, freedom of assembly, and the rule of law, and of course the sovereignty of the United States and the city of New York, override outsiders’ concerns. And the debate, whether this Cordova House should be open, is a separate, and a distinguish debate from any debate that may ensue regarding the content of that house.

My personal hope is that this community center will deliver its promises of interfaith activities. Experience had thought many Israelis who support peace and humanitarian values to expect these hopes to be dashed. But sometimes an act of humanity does come from the Muslim and Palestinian side, usually not with regards to high profile events or personalities. Seen humanity in the words and action of your enemy, helps reconnect to the humanity that is within yourself, and that is a liberating experience. Humanity for both sides is acknowledging the suffering of the innocents on both sides – at minimum. It takes a lot of strength and political courage to do so, as well as personal one.

The question whether the people leading the Cordova Initiative has that courage has nothing to do with the debate over this Islamic community center. If the good will of many of the supporters of this community center will be punished it will be a different issue, one that is between them and the people leading the Cordova Initiative. If lies are indeed catapult against Israel, Israel will deal with it, hopefully in a non-inanimate and non-incompetent manner.

Stand With Us video exposing the BDS movement

BDS, boycott, divestment, sanctions, in their own self-incriminating words.

Stand With Us video on Israeli medical humanitarian aid

"Inshallah"