Sunday, August 3, 2025

Genocide; the data does not add up.

 

There is no genocide in Gaza. No genocide and no starvation. There is suffering, but there is no genocide, and there is no mass starvation. The available data simply does not support these accusations. And I’m not talking about that coming from Israeli sources.

The latest figures from the Palestinian side were published in the WP. They place the total number of killed Gazans at 60,000. 18,500 of whom are children ages 0 to 18. 60,000 in an intense armed conflict that last 21 months cannot be a genocide. The annual growth rate of the population in the Gaza strip is in the 40,000s (2.02% a year). 44 to 46 thousands added each year, mostly through births. This means that during these nearly 2 years of brutal war, between 80,000 to 90,000 souls were added. In a genocide the targeted population decreases in size. And not by a few percentages.

From the CIA factbook.


The data published in the WP is selective. Only children, and no division by gender. But it is useful. It points out that these 18,500 are 31% of the total death count. Less than a third. This is important because among the general population this age group, 0-18, has a share that is close to half. This means that they are underrepresented in the total death count. In a genocide “casualties are not equally distributed by age. Commonly the youngest bear the brunt.” This is the observation of Professor Tadeusz Kugler from Roger Williams University. He wrote that in the paper “The demography of genocide.” A study of the Rwanda genocide. [It was published in August of 2016 by the Oxford university press. It is in a book called “The economic aspects of genocide, mass killings, and their prevention. Edited by Charels H. Anderson and Jurgen Brauer.] This was an observation of the crisis in Rwanda, Bosnia, and Cambodia. And when we zoom in on the details published by the WP, we see how that is not the case in Gaza. The breakdown by age shows a higher death count among the elder teen, and a lower one among younger persons. It shows a steady rise from age 11, 976 dead, to age 17, 1,218 dead. The youngest clearly don’t bear the brunt.











Who does bear the brunt can be learned from an analysis of earlier data done by Gabriel Epstein. His analysis compares the death toll of each age group to its share in the general population. It shows that males ages 15 to 49 are overrepresented in death toll. While younger boys, and all female categories from age 0 to 49, are underrepresented. The entire spectrum of combat age males bears the brunt. As to be expected from a situation known as war. But not a genocide. The fact that categories of age and gender that are both large and more vulnerable are underrepresented shows that the IDF efforts to avoid harming noncombatants is overly successful.



This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that this is not a random occurrence. Last year professor Mike Spagat from the University of London published an article under the damming title, “Netanyahu is wrong about IDF clean record.” Ironically it included the following paragraph. “41.2% of the death listed in the latest MoH list were males between the ages of 15 to 69. Few victims outside this demographic could be combatants.”  This is an acknowledgement that this data challenges his claim. To work around it he introduces a guess that estimates that half of these males are civilians. He does not say what this guess is based on. But can the numbers of civilian males killed in each category of age, (Not including the older ones, that are also small in size), be much bigger than that of females from the same age category? When we go back to Gabriel Epstein’s analysis, we see that there is no uniform relation between the genders. Between ages 10 to 54 the relation is mostly beyond 2:1. And between ages 30 to 39 it is mostly beyond 3:1. This suggests that the share of civilians in each category of males between the ages of 15 to 59 is less than a half. This is an estimation, but at least it is based on data relevant to this specific crisis. That estimation keeps combatants as the largest category. The ones that carry the brunt of the deaths, as to be expected in war.

Mike Spagat Bil'amien words.






Let’s be clear, the choices here are not between genocide and paradise. There is suffering, a lot of it. But it is not genocide. The people we see every day on the news from Gaza are war refugees, trapped in a war zone for 2 years. And that is inhumane. In the long run this could have disastrous consequences. And the long run is now. They are trapped because no one wants to let them out of the strip. No one except Israel. For Israel it will be easier to fight Hamas without civilians used as human shields and other forms of cover. But the international community has other concerns. All of them political. They need to come to a decision. Israel has done its part in protecting the lives of Gazans. The above record shows that. Whether one likes to admit it or not. Israel expected to do everything; it cannot do everything. The civilians that have died show the limit of Israel’s capabilities in protecting them. The only way to avoid a greater crisis is to let them out. Political consequences and other concerns should be taken into account while doing it. But not as a reason to prevent it. It is all a matter of leadership.